纽约时报7月15日发表题为The Echoes of Xinjiang（新疆的回音）的文章，作者PHILIP BOWRING，摘译如下：
对中国而言，新疆问题在国际上引起的麻烦可能甚于西藏。后者吸引西方的众多关注，部分是由于达赖喇嘛的影响力。但西藏没有新疆在外国那种突厥（Turkic）及伊斯兰身份联系。
土耳其总理埃尔多安说中国在新疆的政策“像种族灭绝”，中国“应该放弃其同化政策”，这种评论将长时间回荡在北京耳畔。不管埃尔多安的用词是否过份，他其实是替从地中海到中国中部（原文是central China，但译者怀疑应该是指central asia中亚）的所有突厥人发言。
中国的突厥近邻哈萨克斯坦在寻求平衡与中俄的关系时可能会更加谨慎。
然后还有伊斯兰问题。中亚伊斯兰基本上是一个松散的、非狂热的种类，但新疆的穆斯林身份因宗教活动的受限及全球穆斯林意识的崛起而增强。
但是，中国国家主席胡锦涛需要被提醒不要忘记哈萨克族的真实感受，俄罗斯用了两个世纪的时间试图通过安置俄罗斯移民来解决哈萨克族融合俄罗斯帝国的问题。
同一个时期汉人扩大在满洲，蒙古和台湾统治-主要是通过迁移移民来完成的。因此北京自然地假设，同样可以在新疆完成，虽然在新疆晚了，战后开始的。
但这一进程骚乱之前已陷入僵局，很多汉人已看到中国其他地方有更好的机会。中国的人口不再支持扩大汉族移民。
中国处理维吾尔冤情，可能不是太晚了，但中央集权的倾向和文化沙文主义使变得不可能。中文媒体介绍了动乱的教训表明，正在些教训中学到了一些。
中国曾试图给新疆分裂主义者贴上基地组织的标签，而且毫无疑问会再次这样做——基地组织宣称将报复乌鲁木齐的杀戮，这起到推波助澜的作用。
但主流穆斯林也申诉委屈。在印尼就发生支持维吾尔人的示威。
印尼当然也有自身的分离主义问题，而且华人的定位也是个挥之不去的问题，因此雅加达不大可能发出像埃尔多安那样的声明。马来西亚也是。马来西亚从前对非马来人的歧视会令任何示威抗议都显得伪善，而且会刺激北京公开支持马来西亚华人。
然而对东南亚的很多地方而言，新疆问题与其说是宗教问题不如说是民族问题，因此涉及到对中国南海主张的恐惧，而且中文媒体偶而提到大部分邻国过去与中国的“进贡”关系。
这些并不足以说明对中国的政策将因为维吾尔人而改变，在国际事务的大局下，维吾尔人的问题仍然是小问题。但对中国而言，维吾尔人现在是将来可能仍然是“鞋子里的小石头”就像曾经的印度尼西亚对东帝汶一样。
英文原文链接：http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/opinion/15iht-edbowring.html?_r=1&hpw
The Echoes of Xinjiang
By PHILIP BOWRING
Published: July 14, 2009
HONG KONG — The problems in Xinjiang could prove a bigger international headache for China than Tibet was. The latter attracted much Western attention, thanks in part to the appeal of the exiled Dalai Lama. But Tibet does not have the foreign linkages that Xinjiang’s Turkic and Islamic identity do.
Many Asian countries may find it difficult to ignore popular sentiment in favor of Uighur aspirations.
The comment by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that Chinese policy in Xinjiang was “like a genocide” and that China should “abandon its policy of assimilation,” will ring in Beijing ears for a long time. However excessive his choice of words, Mr. Erdogan was in effect speaking for all Turkic people from the Mediterranean to central China.
China’s immediate Turkic neighbor, Kazakhstan, may be more discreet as it seeks to balance its relations with Russia and China.
But China’s President Hu Jintao should need no reminding of where the sentiments of Kazakhs likely lie, given two centuries of Russian attempts to integrate them into the Russian empire through Russian settlement.
The expansion of Han Chinese rule over that same period — to Manchuria, Mongolia and Taiwan — was largely achieved through migration. So it was only natural for Beijing to assume that the same could be achieved in Xinjiang, despite the late, postwar start.
But the process had already stalled before these riots as many Hans saw better opportunities elsewhere in China. China’s demographics no longer support Han expansion through migration.
It may not be too late for China to address Uighur grievances, but the Chinese Communist Party’s centralist tendencies and cultural chauvinism make it unlikely. The Chinese media’s presentation of the disturbances suggests that few lessons are being learned. Underlying issues go unaddressed, the Hans are presented as the main victims and Uighurs as ungrateful for the material progress that China has bestowed on what was once known as East Turkestan.
Then there is the Islamic issue. Central Asian Islam is mostly of a relaxed and unfanatical sort, but Muslim identity in Xinjiang has been strengthened both by restrictions on religious activities and by the rise in Muslim consciousness globally.
China has tried to pin the Al Qaeda label on Xinjiang separatists and will doubtless do so again — helped by Al Qaeda proclaiming that it will retaliate for the Urumqi killings.
But mainstream Muslims are also sounding aggrieved. In Indonesia, there have been demonstrations in support of the Uighurs.
Indonesia of course has its own ethnic separatist problem in Papua and lingering issues over the position of ethnic Chinese, so no Erdogan-style statements are likely from Jakarta. The same applies in Malaysia, where formal discrimination against non-Malays would make any protests seem hypocritical, and would spur Beijing into overt support for the Malaysian Chinese.
Yet in much of Southeast Asia, the Xinjiang issue is seen not so much as a religious matter as an ethnic one, and thus an issue that touches fears of China’s claims to the South China Sea and its island groups, and occasional Chinese media references to past “tributary” relationships with most of its neighbors.
None of this suggests that policies toward China will change because of the Uighurs, who remain a minor issue in the wider scheme of international affairs. But they are and will likely remain what East Timor once was to Indonesia — a “pebble in the shoe” for China’s diplomacy.
对中国而言，新疆问题在国际上引起的麻烦可能甚于西藏。后者吸引西方的众多关注，部分是由于达赖喇嘛的影响力。但西藏没有新疆在外国那种突厥（Turkic）及伊斯兰身份联系。
土耳其总理埃尔多安说中国在新疆的政策“像种族灭绝”，中国“应该放弃其同化政策”，这种评论将长时间回荡在北京耳畔。不管埃尔多安的用词是否过份，他其实是替从地中海到中国中部（原文是central China，但译者怀疑应该是指central asia中亚）的所有突厥人发言。
中国的突厥近邻哈萨克斯坦在寻求平衡与中俄的关系时可能会更加谨慎。
然后还有伊斯兰问题。中亚伊斯兰基本上是一个松散的、非狂热的种类，但新疆的穆斯林身份因宗教活动的受限及全球穆斯林意识的崛起而增强。
但是，中国国家主席胡锦涛需要被提醒不要忘记哈萨克族的真实感受，俄罗斯用了两个世纪的时间试图通过安置俄罗斯移民来解决哈萨克族融合俄罗斯帝国的问题。
同一个时期汉人扩大在满洲，蒙古和台湾统治-主要是通过迁移移民来完成的。因此北京自然地假设，同样可以在新疆完成，虽然在新疆晚了，战后开始的。
但这一进程骚乱之前已陷入僵局，很多汉人已看到中国其他地方有更好的机会。中国的人口不再支持扩大汉族移民。
中国处理维吾尔冤情，可能不是太晚了，但中央集权的倾向和文化沙文主义使变得不可能。中文媒体介绍了动乱的教训表明，正在些教训中学到了一些。
中国曾试图给新疆分裂主义者贴上基地组织的标签，而且毫无疑问会再次这样做——基地组织宣称将报复乌鲁木齐的杀戮，这起到推波助澜的作用。
但主流穆斯林也申诉委屈。在印尼就发生支持维吾尔人的示威。
印尼当然也有自身的分离主义问题，而且华人的定位也是个挥之不去的问题，因此雅加达不大可能发出像埃尔多安那样的声明。马来西亚也是。马来西亚从前对非马来人的歧视会令任何示威抗议都显得伪善，而且会刺激北京公开支持马来西亚华人。
然而对东南亚的很多地方而言，新疆问题与其说是宗教问题不如说是民族问题，因此涉及到对中国南海主张的恐惧，而且中文媒体偶而提到大部分邻国过去与中国的“进贡”关系。
这些并不足以说明对中国的政策将因为维吾尔人而改变，在国际事务的大局下，维吾尔人的问题仍然是小问题。但对中国而言，维吾尔人现在是将来可能仍然是“鞋子里的小石头”就像曾经的印度尼西亚对东帝汶一样。
英文原文链接：http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/opinion/15iht-edbowring.html?_r=1&hpw
The Echoes of Xinjiang
By PHILIP BOWRING
Published: July 14, 2009
HONG KONG — The problems in Xinjiang could prove a bigger international headache for China than Tibet was. The latter attracted much Western attention, thanks in part to the appeal of the exiled Dalai Lama. But Tibet does not have the foreign linkages that Xinjiang’s Turkic and Islamic identity do.
Many Asian countries may find it difficult to ignore popular sentiment in favor of Uighur aspirations.
The comment by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that Chinese policy in Xinjiang was “like a genocide” and that China should “abandon its policy of assimilation,” will ring in Beijing ears for a long time. However excessive his choice of words, Mr. Erdogan was in effect speaking for all Turkic people from the Mediterranean to central China.
China’s immediate Turkic neighbor, Kazakhstan, may be more discreet as it seeks to balance its relations with Russia and China.
But China’s President Hu Jintao should need no reminding of where the sentiments of Kazakhs likely lie, given two centuries of Russian attempts to integrate them into the Russian empire through Russian settlement.
The expansion of Han Chinese rule over that same period — to Manchuria, Mongolia and Taiwan — was largely achieved through migration. So it was only natural for Beijing to assume that the same could be achieved in Xinjiang, despite the late, postwar start.
But the process had already stalled before these riots as many Hans saw better opportunities elsewhere in China. China’s demographics no longer support Han expansion through migration.
It may not be too late for China to address Uighur grievances, but the Chinese Communist Party’s centralist tendencies and cultural chauvinism make it unlikely. The Chinese media’s presentation of the disturbances suggests that few lessons are being learned. Underlying issues go unaddressed, the Hans are presented as the main victims and Uighurs as ungrateful for the material progress that China has bestowed on what was once known as East Turkestan.
Then there is the Islamic issue. Central Asian Islam is mostly of a relaxed and unfanatical sort, but Muslim identity in Xinjiang has been strengthened both by restrictions on religious activities and by the rise in Muslim consciousness globally.
China has tried to pin the Al Qaeda label on Xinjiang separatists and will doubtless do so again — helped by Al Qaeda proclaiming that it will retaliate for the Urumqi killings.
But mainstream Muslims are also sounding aggrieved. In Indonesia, there have been demonstrations in support of the Uighurs.
Indonesia of course has its own ethnic separatist problem in Papua and lingering issues over the position of ethnic Chinese, so no Erdogan-style statements are likely from Jakarta. The same applies in Malaysia, where formal discrimination against non-Malays would make any protests seem hypocritical, and would spur Beijing into overt support for the Malaysian Chinese.
Yet in much of Southeast Asia, the Xinjiang issue is seen not so much as a religious matter as an ethnic one, and thus an issue that touches fears of China’s claims to the South China Sea and its island groups, and occasional Chinese media references to past “tributary” relationships with most of its neighbors.
None of this suggests that policies toward China will change because of the Uighurs, who remain a minor issue in the wider scheme of international affairs. But they are and will likely remain what East Timor once was to Indonesia — a “pebble in the shoe” for China’s diplomacy.
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