From 1949 onwards ，the re-emergence of a new and strong centralised powerenabled China to reassert sovereignty over the region.The communist regime thenintroduced a nationalities policy modelled on the Soviet pattern：55national minorities（shaoshu minzu ），together with the Han，make up the Chinese nation.Ever since，for the first time in China ，this policy has guaranteed the recognition of thelinguistic and cultural identities of the national minorities ，while grantingthem certain advantages ，helping them to integrate within the new system[10].

At the same time，once the opposition of Pan-Turkist separatists and the lastof the underground rebels had been eradicated ，the province of Xinjiang was transformed，in 1955，into an autonomous region.But this autonomy was in reality only symbolic，and contrasted sharply with the real political autonomy that many had been hopingfor.Indeed ，the region ‘s political system remains under the control of theCommunist Party ，itself dominated by the original Han population of China ’sinterior.The shortcomings of this system built up a powerful sense of frustration，preventing Uyghur society from realising many of its aspirations and from challengingcertain policies it had overwhelmingly rejected ；of these ，undoubtedly the mostunpopular was the colonisation of the region.

From the 1950s onwards，the communist regime encouraged the settlement of Hanpopulation centres in order to secure ，control and exploit the region ，whichis rich in hydrocarbons ，mineral resources and virgin agricultural land[11].Since1949，the region has seen a massive inflow of Han immigrants mainly directed thereby the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps （XPCC）（Xinjiang shengchan jianchebingtuan）。Originally ，this organisation had helped former soldiers demobilisedafter the Civil War to settle down，by providing some advantages to its members.These corps of“peasant-soldiers”sent to the margins of the country to open upnew pioneer areas did not survive the Cultural Revolution ，except in Xinjiangwhere they were revitalised during the 1980s in order to pursue demographic colonisationwhile boosting the manpower needed to provide security for the region.Subsidisedup to 80%by the central government ，the XPCCs today control nearly one-thirdof the local farmed land and produce about a quarter of the provincial industrialoutput[12].During the 1950s，the XPCCs had about a hundred thousand members ；today their numbers are above 2.4million ，of whom 90%are Han（that is ，one-thirdof the Han living “officially”in Xinjiang[13]）。Thanks to the XPCCs，and alsoto migratory inflows not directly controlled by the state ，the Han populationhas risen from 6.7%of the region ‘s population in 1949to about 40%today ，thatis，more than seven million out of a total of 18.5million inhabitants （see Table1）。But colonisation has not stabilised the region —far from it.Its socio-economicrepercussions ，together with Peking ’s domineering attitude towards the regionalpolitical system，have generated a malaise that has lent new vigour in recent yearsto Uyghur nationalism and separatism.

This phenomenon has been catalysed at the same time by changes in the politicalcontext of the region.Indeed ，the victory of the Afghan mujaheddin over the RedArmy and，with the break-up of the Soviet Union，the independence of the centralAsian republics have galvanised Uyghur separatism.Many of the militants have seenin the emergence of national states as homelands for the other large Turkic populationsof Central Asia （Kazakhstan，Kirghizstan，Uzbekistan ，Turkmenistan …），the justification of their own aspirations to independence.Moreover，by reasonof the cultural and religious ties that the Uyghurs share with the rest of CentralAsia，these events have given them hopes of drawing new support from beyond theirown borders.This potentiality for destabilisation，the concomitant swell of unrestin Xinjiang and the rise of Islamism[14]in Central Asia during the 1990s have ledPeking to react.

China ，torn between the necessity for opening its frontiers to economic inflowsand the wish to isolate Uyghur opposition from any exterior support or“subversive”influence ，has combined its policy of speeding up the region‘s economic developmentwith strengthening its security collaboration with its neighbours ，pursuing demographiccolonisation and stiffening its repression of those political activities that itconsiders unlawful.But ，by failing to take account of either the destabilisingimpact of colonisation on Uyghur society or the demand for self-government amongthe local population，these policies could not solve the real problems behind thegrowth of unrest.

The origins of Uyghur malaise ：colonisation and socio-economic stratification

Colonisation and its socio-economic consequences are much disliked by the Uyghurs：they constitute the main grievance among the protest movements.Indeed ，colonisationtends ，through a complex process，to exclude Xinjiang‘s national minoritiesfrom the benefits of economic advance.In attempting to stabilise the region，thecentral state has made significant investments[15]that have contributed to developingthe local economy.This region，once among the poorest in China，today，withinthe provinces of China’s “Great West”[16]，now boasts the highest per capitaGDP ；in these terms it ranks twelfth among all China‘s provinces[17].However，these encouraging macro-economic figures hide pronounced inequalities that applyalong ethnic lines.To Uyghur eyes，the investments are directed first towardsthe areas of colonisation[18]，and have benefited the Han colonists most of all.Thus，the per capita GDP in Han areas is far higher than that in areas where theUyghurs are still in the majority （see Table 2）。The low figure for GDP perhead in the Tarim Basin ，where three-quarters of Xinjiang ’s Uyghur populationis concentrated ，makes it likely that a significant number of families have incomesbelow the Chinese poverty threshold and even further beneath the threshold set bythe international organisations[19].

At the same time，these differences in income imposed along ethnic lines underlieunequal access to the educational system—which ，in turn，serves to reinforcethe economic inequalities.In effect，the inability of the poorest people to financetheir children‘s schooling perpetuates —even more than linguistic handicaps[20]and a sometimes discriminatory job-recruitment system —socio-professional inequalitiescondemning much of the Uyghur population to the lowest rungs of society.

Theoretically ，the Chinese education system is supposed to make it easierfor minorities to climb the social scale，by means of a system of quotas and universityscholarships.However the partial withdrawal of the state from financing the educationsystem has led to an increase in schooling costs and falling numbers of scholarships.With the liberalisation of the Chinese economy，some financial security is moreand more necessary in order to pursue one ‘s studies.The poorest families do nothave the means to provide a full education for their children ；and they have torestrict their years at school.While Han families，usually urban and better off，can extend their children ’s education ，and send them to the best establishments，the children of the minority communities are unable to complete their secondaryeducation （see Table 3），which means they leave school with fewer qualifications（see Table 4）。

These differences in educational funding combined with recruitment methods thatare often discriminatory in the private sector[21]tend to perpetuate ，over aperiod of several decades ，socio-professional stratification：Uyghurs are penalisedin comparison with the Han.The national minorities in Xinjiang are over-representedat the bottom of the socio-professional scale and the Han are over-represented atthe top.Thus ，while the national minorities represented nearly 54%of Xinjiang‘s population in 1990，they accounted for more than 76%of its agricultural workforce（as against 69.4%in 1982when they were 52.8%of the total population ），lessthan 41%of those employed in liberal and technical professions and less than 30%of managers and administrators[22].

As the national minorities descend the socio-economic scale in Xinjiang ，theirliving standards become more precarious because China has almost no social securitysystem whatever.According to the 1990census ，the infant mortality rate amongthe national minorities in Xinjiang was 3.6times higher than among the Han andtheir life expectancy was 62.9years as against 71.4for the Han.At the same time，unemployment among young Uyghurs has led to higher crime rates and drug-taking—though these are culturally alien to this Muslim society.Poverty ，and also theinequalities mentioned above，give Uyghurs the sense that they are excluded fromeconomic growth to the benefit of the Han.The status of“second-rate ”Chinesecitizen contrasts with the promises of wealth and equality made by the regime atthe time of Xinjiang‘s “peaceful liberation ”，and it has led many Uyghurs tothink that they have been fooled by Peking’s communist pretensions and that，inreality ，they are living under the yoke of a colonial regime.

Elite expectations and nationalism among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang

It is suggested ，in the debate over the notion of internal colonialism[23]，that under administrations that are colonial or perceived as such ，socio-economicstratification along ethnic lines around the peripheries of some states is likelyto encourage an increasing sense of identity and the rise of nationalism.Even thoughthis kind of approach does not explain all the factors and paradigms entering theequation in the birth and the growing influence of nationalism in Xinjiang sincethe start of the twentieth century，it does help us to see how such inequalitieshave favoured the strengthening of Uyghur nationalism over the past twenty years.Indeed，going beyond cultural identity ，socio-economic and political stratificationin Xinjiang has brought many Uyghurs to view themselves as a lower-grade community，separate from the central community （that is to say，the Han）that dominatesthe economic and political systems.To that extent，it has favoured the emergenceof anti-colonial nationalism[24]，fuelled by the distinctive identity of the Uyghursto legitimise the establishment of real self-government （which would at last servethe interests of the Uyghurs—and not those exclusively of Peking and the Han ）。

The Uyghur elite，more numerous and driven to compete with the Han ，haveincreasing difficulty in fitting into the system[25].It is true that the Chineseregime does attempt to co-opt a proportion of the Uyghurs into the administrationbut ，even though noteworthy efforts have been made since the 1950s，it seemsthat over these last decades they have not been enough to integrate all the newUyghur elite inside the system.In the 1950s，because of the small number of Uyghurswho had been educated ，it was relatively easy for them to find posts on a levelwith their expectations.Over the past twenty years ，with the end of the policyof the“iron rice bowl”（tiefanwan ）and the arrival of greater numbers of well-qualifiedUyghurs and ，in particular，Han in the job market，the integration of some eliteUyghurs has become more problematical.Thus ，many young Uyghurs of working-classor middle-class origins reproach the Chinese regime for not providing them withjob opportunities commensurate with their training and，instead，for favouringthe appointment of Han to management posts[26].

The small amount of data relating to the ethnic origins of some of the Xinjiangelite appears to support such contentions.For example，in 1990，the nationalminorities provided only 28.8%of the total number of managers and administratorsin Xinjiang[27].This state of affairs is also observable within the political system：officials drawn from the national minorities are still under-represented in theXinjiang Communist Party.They accounted for only 37.3%of its members in 1997[28].Moreover，bearing in mind that their loyalty towards Peking is considered suspect，they are often held down in posts with little power or posts where they can easilybe controlled.Admittedly ，the Presidents of the People ‘s Government of theXinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ，of each Autonomous Prefecture and of each AutonomousVillage are elected on the basis of the titular nationality of the autonomous administrativeentity.However ，as everywhere else in China，the Chinese Communist Party（CCP）is the controlling force behind political institutions.And the most important CCPposts in Xinjiang are held by Han loyal to Peking and not by members of nationalminorities.For example ，it is revealing to note that ，ever since 1949，thepost of Secretary of the CCP in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has been occupiedin an almost systematic way by Han Chinese.

In sum，while a proportion of the Uyghur elite is integrated ，even very wellintegrated，and has been for several generations ，a growing number of the newelite find increasing difficulty in fulfilling their expectations and feel resentfulof being excluded ，even colonised.Shifting this fault line ，where the integrationof Uyghur elites is concerned ，acts as a kind of measuring instrument for Uyghurnationalism.If the indicator moves towards “fewer well-integrated elite ”，thenationalist opposition is likely to show itself more structured and more vigorous.Today ，the fact that poorly integrated elite Uyghurs are more numerous than beforeexplains the rising discontent among young educated people and the strengtheningof their political opposition.Yet，the fact that a proportion of them continuesto be “well integrated ”harms the structure of Uyghur nationalism by preventingfor the present the large-scale recruitment of officials likely to organise massmovements.

Reassertion of identity and Islamic revival among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang

Ever since the dark days of the Cultural Revolution ，the relative opennessthat has followed Deng Xiaoping ‘s rise to power has left the way open to a vastmovement for revitalising local culture.The 1980s saw a return towards the traditionsand the “imagined foundations”of Uyghur identity.This phenomenon in its manyforms manifests itself，for example，in the proliferation of books and academicresearch into Uyghur history and culture.It has also taken the form，as amongthe Hui ，of an Islamic revival[29].While publications relating to Islam flourished，mosques were renovated and many new ones built.Similarly ，religious educationdeveloped strongly：Koranic schools were opened，attached to mosques on the onehand or ，on the other ，as private schools —usually undeclared[30].This Islamicrevival ，observed right across China，has nevertheless assumed a distinctivedimension among the Uyghurs.For them it is part of a logic of return （or perceivedreturn）to practices formerly discouraged or repressed ，but it is also at themargin part of a more militant logic using Islam as an instrument for distinguishingUyghur values[31]from the non-clerical and atheistic values promoted by the Chineseauthorities.

The revival of the Uyghurs‘Islamic culture and identity has also led ，duringthe 1980s ，to the formation of student associations aiming to promote the rightsand culture of the Uyghurs：the Tengritakh Association （Tianshan），the YouthAssociation of East Turkistan ，the Students ’Cultural and Scientific Association[32]…Some of these student associations，which reflect the growing strength of thedemocratic student movement in China and challenge“Great Han chauvinism”，seemquickly to have adopted a militant style.This is conveyed in a report reflectingCCP anxiety ：

In the thirty years between 1949and 1979，almost no demonstration was heldby the Xinjiang minority students in Xinjiang ，but after 1980，student demonstrationshave broke out one after another.This is a new phenomena.Uyghur students fromseven universities and colleges including Xinjiang University in Urumqi demonstratedon December 12th 1985.They were openly against the Central Government’s decision.[...]Some of the students from Xinjiang University got together and organizedthis well planned and well organized political incident for which the Xinjiang Universitybecame the headquarter.Before and after that incident，some pro-separatism postersand flyers with contents such as：“Chinese out of Xinjiang ”，“Independence forXinjiang”，“Cut off the railroad from China proper to Xinjiang”were discoveredin Urumqi and other districts.In June 1986，another demonstration was organizedby a student association in Xinjiang University.[...]Using the“support forthe minority education”as a cover，they attacked Central Communist Party’s minorityautonomy policy ，damaged the good relationship among the nationalities.They usedslogans such as “No big Chinese Nationalism”，“No Chinese population transferto Xinjiang ”，and created a very bad influence in the society.[33]

Outside the campuses，the revival of the meshrep[34]expresses the wish torevitalise Uyghur culture and identity.At the start of the 1990s ，young Uyghursof the region of Ghulja （Yining）launched a movement to re-invigorate these gatheringswhich have spread rapidly.However，the movement has also taken，according tothe Chinese authorities ，a“counter-revolutionary ”turn.Fearing that it mightbecome a focus for protest and“local nationalism ”（difang minzuzhuyi ），theregional government banned the meshrep in 1995；and the people who had launchedthe movement were imprisoned[35].

The rise and fall of two clandestine political movements of some stature

This aspiration to greater militancy[36]has also taken the form of clandestinepolitical movements[37]that，in Xinjiang and in the Diaspora[38]，are foundedon Uyghur nationalism tinged with Pan-Turkism[39].Admittedly ，these movementsare not “mass movements”—and even less so in the present climate of repression.Uyghur militancy is driven mostly by a fringe group of young students and intellectuals，purged regularly by Chinese repression.Up until the 1990s，two successive clandestinegroups in the tradition of the pre-1949oppositional currents ，both quite durable，dominated the underground political scene.Of these two nationalist Pan-Turkistparties ，one，socialist and secular，relied on Soviet aid ，and the other camefrom the anti-communist and Islamic tradition centred on the south of Xinjiang.Both could call upon a base of militancy that was relatively wide compared withpresent-day groupings （see below ）。At the same time they were counting on significantunderground mobilisation to prepare for a general uprising in Xinjiang.

After 1949，the first big organised clandestine party was formed under thename of the Eastern Turkistan People‘s Party （ETPP）（Sharki Turkistan Halk Partisi）。Mainly drawing in Uyghurs but also Kazakhs，it was founded in secret ，accordingto the Chinese authorities，in February 1968；but，according to the militantswho have now taken refuge abroad，some of its cells had already been active forseveral years beforehand[40].This was a separatist Pan-Turkist party with Marxistallegiances.Well-structured and hierarchic ，it swiftly recruited former officialsof the East Turkistan Republic as well as young people from Turkic-speaking minorities.According to the East Turkistan National Centre ，this party numbered more than60，000members and 178branches in Xinjiang[41].These figures are hard to verify.However ，the ETPP is probably the largest secret organisation ever created sincethe liberation of Xinjiang.The rise to power of this underground party seems tohave been favoured mainly by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and by thedeterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.Indeed，the USSR did give help to the ETPP.As is confirmed by Chinese sources and the testimony of some of its former militants，the KGB developed its links with this party mostly through its agents active inKazakhstan and seems to have provided it with logistical support on several occasions：

The ETPP’s Central Committee and subcommittee drafted articles such as“TheDestiny of the Uyghurs”，“Eastern Turkestan People’s Party’s Constitution ”and“Eastern Turkestan People’s Party’s General Principles ”。[...]they all claim[...]“Seize the power with the help of the Soviet Union and establish an independentEastern Turkestan Republic”[...].Some of them even held the banner of Marxismand Leninism and proposed ：“We want to establishing an independent country accordingto the Marxist principle of self-determination of different peoples ”。[...]On a dozen occasions，the“ETPP”’s Ili Committee，Urumqi Branch，and Altay Bureaualso sent their delegations to Soviet Union and Mongolia Republic to beg for armsand the use of radio stations for their riots and ask for military advisors.TheSoviet Spy agency sent a group of fourteen people with spies carrying radio transmitters，weapons and funds for their activities.These groups arrived in Xinjiang and establishedcommunication with the“ETPP”nine times.[42]

The ETPP focused its activity on mobilising Turkic-speaking populations andofficials in Xinjiang with the aim of preparing a mass insurrection against Peking.At the same time，it took up guerrilla activities（sabotage，skirmishes with thepolice and the Chinese army …）and was behind various attempts at insurrectionduring the 1960s and the 1970s.Still quite active during the 1970s ，it was graduallyweakened by the arrest of its leaders ，by the gradual falling away of Soviet supportas the tension between Moscow and Peking relaxed，and then by the decline of thecommunist ideology.Nevertheless，while the ETPP was in decline，a new party ofanti-Marxist opposition was developing in southern Xinjiang.

As the Soviet Union lost its appeal among anti-colonialist Muslims to the benefitof revolutionary Islam，and as the revival of Islamism was gathering pace in Xinjiang，the Islamic Pan-Turkic trend centred on the south of Xinjiang was given renewedvigour by new young leaders.It was re-organised around the East Turkistan IslamicParty （ETIP）（Sharki Turkistan Islam Partisi）。This Pan-Turkic nationalist movementalso aimed at renewing Islam among the Uyghurs and developed from networks of mosquesin southern Xinjiang during the 1980s.According to official sources，it apparentlygenerated offshoots in numerous cities in the Tarim Basin ，indeed as far as Ghulja（Yining），Turfan and Urumqi[43].Probably also inspired by the Afghans ‘successagainst the Soviets ，it really came into prominence in April 1990at the timeof the Baren insurrection （near Kashgar）。The rising took the form of a jihadrecalling that which led to the creation of the Turk Islamic Republic of East Turkistan（1933-1934）[44].

The insurrection，which lasted for several days，caused several dozen deathson the insurgents ‘side and forced the Chinese army to deploy significant forcesin the region to put down the rebellion.The Chinese authorities view the ETIP aspart of the Jihadist current on the other side of the Pamirs；and they considerthat it gave birth to more“radical ”groupings such as the Party of Allah and theIslamic Movement of East Turkistan.Because of the little information availableabout this organisation ，such links are difficult to check and to determine astrue or false.However，the slogans proclaimed during the insurrection suggestthat the ETIP at this time was more a renovated form of the Islamic Pan-Turkismhistorically established in the south of Xinjiang than a pure reincarnation of radicalIslam ：

He [Yusuf Zeydin，leader of the local branch of the ETIP]and his followersopenly shouted：“Down with the socialism ！”，“In the past Marxism suppressedreligion，and now it is religion’s turn to suppress Marxism”，“Unite all theTurk peoples，long live the great Eastern Turkistan！”，“Take Barin，establishEastern Turkistan ”。[45]

The subsequent repression prevented the party from being reconstituted on suchwide foundations，despite attempts at this of some of its members in the early1990s.

The 1990s ：the turn towards repression

Whereas the 1980s are perceived by many Uyghurs as a period of reduced tension，even of an improvement in the relations between Uyghur society and the Chinese state，the 1990s saw the emergence of a repressive climate that engendered powerful frustrationsand resentment.The 1990s increase in repression is generally linked with exacerbatedParty anxieties on several levels.

Nationally，the conservative wing of the CCP considered that the worst wasavoided after the Tiananmen events in 1989，whereas similar events took place inconsequence on campuses in Xinjiang （see above ）。It considers that an authoritariancrackdown is essential to ensure the survival of the regime.At the same time ，at the start of the 1990s ，the Chinese regime feared that the accession to independenceof the Central Asian Republics，and also the spread of radical Islam in the region（see below ），would seriously destabilise Xinjiang if nothing was done.On theone hand，the accession to independence of other large Turkic populations of CentralAsia was likely to legitimise and strengthen Uyghur separatism.On the other，thecultural links that bind the Uyghurs together with the peoples of the new Republics，and also with the Uyghur Diaspora in these countries[46]，allowed Peking to fearthat solidarity would build up between the Uyghur separatists and these states（or certain organisations present on their soil）。Firstly，some of them （Kazakhstanand Kirghizstan in particular ）have effectively offered asylum to the new refugees，and even recognised organisations of the local Diaspora defending the independenceof East Turkistan.Peking then applied itself to cutting off the militants activein Xinjiang from these potential supports outside.By playing on the prospects forsettling frontier disputes and for economic co-operation，and by promoting co-operationin the struggle against separatism and Islamism in Central Asia through the ShanghaiCo-operation Organisation （SCO ）[47]，China persuaded the Central Asian republicsto ban the Uyghur organisations present on their territories，and even today toextradite some militants who have recently taken refuge there[48].

On the domestic front ，the Chinese regime confronted by the rise of Uyghurnationalism and by Islamic anti-governmental subversion has progressively tightenedits control over society and the spaces for expressing identity and religion[49]to prevent the start of dynamics that might have made the situation uncontrollable.At the same time as relations between the Chinese state and Uyghur society werebecoming strained and disturbances，sometimes violent，were on the rise （theBaren insurrection in 1990，the disturbances of the summer and autumn of 1993overthe whole province，and the riots of July 7th 1995in Khotan ），the Chinese regime‘s grip was progressively tightened.

The turning point really came in 1996-1997，following the launch in April 1996of the great national campaign against crime“Strike hard ”。This campaign beganshortly after a special meeting in March 1996on maintaining stability in Xinjiang，and so there it assumed a special dimension ，being targeted at separatism andillegal religious activities.The Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCPthen issued an exhaustive list of strict directives aimed at tightening controlover Xinjiang and eradicating potentially subversive activities[50].As part ofthe same campaign ，a succession of strong-arm police operations was mounted（the special 100-day crackdown from January to March 1999，the“General Campaignagainst Terrorism ”from April to June 1999，the new campaign “Strike hard ”from April 2001onwards ，the drive against separatism in October 2001…）。Thisintense campaign of repression led to thousands of arrests and also to constanthuman rights violations and the improper use of the death penalty[51].By fencingoff ，even closing down，the last spaces for the expression of identity or religion[52]，these restrictions put relations between Uyghur society and the Chinese regime underconsiderable strain.They gave the impression that the real target of the Chineseregime‘s attacks was not so much separatism or even Islamism but Uyghur identityitself[53].

More disturbances and more radicalisation during the 1990s

During the same period，the introduction of a market economy combined withcompetition from ever-increasing numbers of Han placed the social climate understrain.Local politicians ，in thrall to Peking，are unable to challenge policiesimposed from the centre and often very strongly disliked（nuclear tests on the LopNor site，the restriction of religious freedoms，the enforcement of birth controlwhile colonists are flooding in …）；this fact has provoked numerous protest movements.Faced with a strained social and political climate，the local authorities（whocannot challenge the policies dictated by Peking）have often reacted with brutality.They have sometimes helped to give an insurrectional twist to protest movementsthat，originally ，were merely directed against unpopular measures[54].Whilethe disturbances became more frequent[55]in response to excessive Chinese repression，throughout the 1990s new groupings appeared in Xinjiang and the Diaspora.In theDiaspora，most organisations began to federate around the rejection of violentaction while lobbying for the Uyghurs ‘basic rights to be protected[56]；by contrast，in Xinjiang ，groups with a sometimes reduced life expectancy，but adopting moreradical modes of action ，appeared.They protected themselves by keeping theirmemberships small ，or withdrew from China （to Central Asia ，Afghanistan orTurkey）。

They carried out numerous guerrilla operations（sabotage[57]，arson，attackson police barracks or military bases），and even graduated to acts of terrorism（assassinations of Han officials or Uyghur collaborators ，and bomb attacks ）。The increasing frequency of acts of violence and terrorism in Xinjiang during the1990s does not mean that all the Uyghur political movements support these modesof action.But，just recently，the Chinese authorities have generally harped onabout the frequency of acts of violence to give the Uyghur opposition the imageof a primarily terrorist force.

Only a short while ago，the Chinese government was opting to hush up the newsof these disturbances.However，following the events of September 11th 2001，itdecided to put out information about the more violent acts and the terrorist attackscarried out during this period.It attributed some of them to armed groups who，to date ，seem mostly to have disappeared or become dormant[58].The Shock Brigadeof the Islamic Reformist Party are held responsible for the attack that ，on theChinese New Year in February 1992，killed three people in a bus at Urumqi[59].The East Turkistan Democratic Islamic Party is held to have carried out the bombattacks in the south of Xinjiang that killed four victims between June and September1993[60].The most memorable crime，that of February 25th 1997in Urumqi （on theday of Deng Xiaoping‘s funeral ），was attributed to the East Turkistan NationalUnity Alliance.Four bombs had been planted on different bus routes.The resultingexplosions killed nine and wounded 74.On the other hand，the Chinese regime didnot mention in its report the crime committed during the annual meeting of the NationalPeople’s Congress on March 7th 1997：the bomb went off in a bus in Peking ‘sXidan district（30injured and two dead ）。Responsibility for this attack ，thefirst to affect Peking since 1949，was claimed by the Organisation for East TurkistanFreedom （based in Turkey ），but the Chinese government denied that any Uyghurswere involved in this attack.

The spread of radical Islam in Xinjiang

At the same time，connections have apparently been made between some Uyghurmilitants and Islamic movements.This phenomenon seems to be linked to several factors.On the one hand ，the socio-political model promoted by these movements may haveseemed a preferable alternative to the Chinese model perceived as colonial and culturallyinvasive.The desire to establish a political and social order that would put UyghurMuslims at the centre of the system is very strong.Some Uyghur militants were probablyalso influenced by the hope that by imposing a strict Islamic framework they mightat the same time find a solution to the present social problems.On the other hand，bearing in mind the cessation of support（active or passive ）from the USSR andlater of the Central Asian republics and taking account also of the indifferenceof the West[61]，the vital necessity of finding foreign support over which Chinesediplomacy had no hold also played an important role.Some Uyghur movements saw inthe Islamic card a means of playing on the solidarity existing between Muslims withinthe Umma to attempt to win political support，fallback bases ，even training facilitiesand funds to further the struggle against Chinese power in Xinjiang.

The first links seem to have been made during the 1980s.During this period ，many foreigners （traders ，preachers [62]…）profited from the relative relaxationof Chinese control to proselytise their causes in China itself[63].At the sametime，with the opening of frontiers and the loosening of restrictions governingthe Mecca pilgrimage，Uyghurs travelling abroad came into contact with proselytisingmovements working in Pakistan ，Central Asia or in some Arab countries.Links werecreated in these cases too.At the same time also ，as the restrictions on religiouseducation in Xinjiang were being strengthened ，many young Uyghurs went abroad.Through connections established during the 1980s or through family links on thespot，these young people —and also Uyghurs in the Diaspora—took religious coursesin the Koranic schools sometimes attached to Islamist movements.

Thus，in Kazakhstan it seems that some Uyghurs joined the Islamic RenaissanceParty[64].In Uzbekistan and in Kirghizstan some of them joined the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan （IMU ）or else Hizb-ut Tahrir （HT）[65].The other favoured placefor recruitment was Pakistan.Chinese researchers suggest that about ten thousandUyghurs went to Pakistan to receive a religious education[66].This figure is hardto verify.Nevertheless ，some of them did indeed follow programmes in fundamentalistKoranic schools in Pakistan ，and were even in contact with various local Islamistmovements （Jamaat-e Islami[67]，Jamaat al-Tabligh [68]…）。Through these connections，some Uyghurs took part in military operations.It seems that the Hizb ul-Mujahidin[69]and the Salafist Jihadist[70]movement Lashkar-e Taiba in particular[71]enrolleda handful of Uyghurs in the Kashmir conflict[72].However ，most of the Uyghursinvolved in the Jihad were in Afghanistan （mainly in the ranks of the Hizb-e Islami，the Taliban and later in the ranks of the IMU ）。Quoting official Russian sourcesand Chinese experts ，the Chinese press has published figures ranging from over200Uyghurs in the“bin Laden camps ”to more than a thousand having received somemilitary training in Afghanistan[73].Again ，the figures are difficult to check.However ，after the fall of the Taliban，the new Afghan government claims it hasonly a score of Chinese prisoners （who it has promised to hand over to the Chineseauthorities ）。So one may presume that the Uyghurs amount only to a negligibleproportion of the foreign supporters fighting alongside local radical movements.

The Islamist faction in Xinjiang：a marginal threat but useful to the Chineseregime

During the 1990s，some of these young Uyghurs formed in their turn a smallnumber of Islamist（or Islamic nationalist）groups which ，according to Peking，have links with Salafist Jihadist networks based in the region.Because we havelittle reliable information about these ultra-clandestine organisations ，it isvery difficult to be specific about their ideology.For the most part ，they beginwith a nucleus of Uyghurs who have often received Islamic training abroad and aresometimes trained in combat and the use of explosives ；around them are groupedthe militants they themselves have recruited locally.However ，the fact that theydo not recruit from the Hui and that their discourse lays greater emphasis on liberatingEast Turkistan than on creating an Islamic state（or on returning to a purifiedform of Islam ）suggests that their agenda is still mainly nationalist[74].

Without having carried out a massive recruitment，these groups have concentratedon enrolling young people from the urban working class，mainly from southern Xinjiang.Admittedly，the substratum of urban youth，disconnected with Islam in its traditionalSufi form[75]，provides a reservoir of people that could feed the developmentof these groups.However，although one may recently observe the growing power ofthe neo-fundamentalist Hizb ut-Tahrir group[76]，the Islamist groups in Xinjianghave lost much of their membership and have been officially dismantled by the Chinesepolice.In reality，Chinese security focused its attention firstly on the EastTurkistan Islamic Party of Allah（whose name recalls Hezbollah）。Founded in 1993according to some sources and in 1997according to others[77]，the membershipof this organisation campaigning for the creation of an Islamic state numbered fromone hundred to fifteen hundred.According to the Chinese authorities，its membersattacked individuals associated with the Chinese government.A wave of arrests atthe end of the 1990s seems to have uncovered preparations for bombing attacks.Inthe end ，according to the Chinese press ，the Party of Allah was dismantled afew years ago.

Yet ，after the events of September 11th 2001，the marginal existence of thiskind of group was used by the Chinese regime to attempt to include the wholesalerepression of the Uyghur opposition within the international dynamic of the struggleagainst Islamist terrorist networks[78].While the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministerdeclared in November 2001at the UN that“the terrorist forces of East Turkistanare trained ，equipped and financed by international terrorist organisations ”，in January 2002the State Council published an ambiguous report laying stress onthe supposed links between al-Qaeda and the Uyghur opposition grouped under thefalsely unifying label of Dongtu[79].In fact ，there is no structure that controlsall the Uyghur movements in Xinjiang and abroad ；and the vast majority of themhave no connection，either ideological or organisational ，with radical Islam.Yet ，by stressing the supposed links of the Party of Allah and the East TurkistanIslamic Movement（ETIM）with al-Qaeda，this report tends to lump together disparateelements of this kind.According to the thesis proposed by the State Council，membersof these groups received training in Afghanistan.The leaders of the ETIM （a groupthat until then was almost unknown）are alleged to have met bin Laden at the startof 1999and in February 2001；and he is alleged to have agreed to provide themwith“fabulous sums ”[80].It is possible that these movements ，and particularlythe ETIM，might have had contacts with the bin Laden network and more probablywith the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan[81].But the Chinese declarations that attemptto show particularly close relationships fly in the face of bin Laden ‘s silenceon East Turkistan.

For his part，the leader of the ETIM ，Hasan Mahsum ，assured Radio FreeAsia on January 22nd 2002that his ultimate aim was the liberation of Xinjiang；and he denied any organic link with al-Qaeda.Even so ，the Chinese lobbying didbear fruit.It enabled China to persuade the US government，at the end of August2002，and then the UN Security Council to include on the list of groupings linkedto al-Qaeda the East Turkistan Islamic Movement ；it was given an extended descriptionunder a triple name ：the East Turkistan Islamic Movement，the East TurkistanIslamic Party of Allah and the East Turkistan Islamic Party[82].

The Chinese regime and the Uyghur dilemma

The consequences of the policies pursued by the Chinese regime reveal the politicalimpasse it has run into by attacking the expressions of Uyghur malaise without attackingits real causes.Mao Zedong ，going back on his promises ，quickly opted for repressionto put an end to demands for self-government，which had been made as early as the1950s.The Chinese regime then outlawed any kind of protest against the policiesimposed on Xinjiang ；it also closed up most of the spaces in which the cultureand the religious convictions of the Uyghurs could be expressed.In this way itfed frustrations that were also exacerbated by colonisation and the socio-economicstratification that it led to.When ，to reduce tension，the regime partiallyre-opened these spaces，the re-opening simply allowed the power of Uyghur nationalismto grow.And since Peking closed the spaces and reverted to repression，all hopesof self-government，even of dialogue with the Chinese authorities，have flownout of the window.Now that relations have completely broken d

own ，acts of violencehave replaced peaceful demonstrations as the expression of the Uyghur malaise.Isolatedas they have been by skilful Chinese diplomacy，what remains of the Uyghur oppositionin Xinjiang is now open to all kinds of extremism.

Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell

________________________________________________________

[1]This study is based mainly on data gathered by the author since the endof the 1990s in Xinjiang and within the Uyghur Diaspora.

[2]Sharki Turkistan in Uyghur.

[3]Historically，these communities shared the various ecological niches inthe area.The oases to the south of the Tianshan mountains，that is to say theoases of the Tarim，Turfan and Kumul （Hami）Basins are traditionally populatedby sedentary Uyghurs.The Tianshan chain and the steppes to the north are home tothe Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads.To these Turkic-speaking populations are added thenomadic Mongols to the north and east ，a Tajik community in the Pamirs and a fewUzbek and Tatar traders in the large oases.Following the conquest of the regionby the Qing ，Han，Manchurian population demobilised or sent there to ensure controlof the north of the province，and Chinese Muslims（Hui ）came to settle.

[4]These Turkic-speaking populations have in common to be Sunni muslims ofthe Hanafi rite and to practise an Islam influenced by Sufism.Only the Tajiks ofthe Chinese Pamirs depart from this rule.They are Iranian-speaking ，and are partof the Ismaelian branch of Shiism.

[5]Until the twentieth century ，these populations，fragmented by differencesof identity and by political and religious rivalries between oases，referred totheir geographic origin （their oasis of origin ）to identify themselves.The termUyghur refers to the Turkic people who，in the Middle Ages ，developed a brilliantcivilisation in the east of Xinjiang.This ethnonym ，having disappeared sinceIslamisation，was revived by Russian ethnologists；it was brought back into serviceduring the 1930s by Soviet advisors of Sheng Shicai to designate the Turkic-speakingsedentary Muslim communities speaking the Turki dialect of the Xinjiang oases.SeeDru Gladney ，“The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur”，Central Asian Survey ，Vol.9，No.1，1990，pp.1-28；Abdurahman Abdullah，Tashkentchilair（Those whohave studied in Tashkent），Xinjiang Renmin chubanshe，2002.

[6]Pan-Turkism ，which was partly confused with Jadidism in Central Asia，developed in the 1880s among the Tatars of Russia.This reform movement aimed torestore political influence to the Muslim Turkish peoples and to awaken their nationalconsciousness by modernising them （educational reforms ，theological reforms…）Though it cannot be on the scale of the Turkish world as a whole，Pan-Turkism，closely mingled with Uyghur nationalism ，helps to unite the various Turkic-speakingpopulations of East Turkistan behind the same political project.

[7]Masami Hamada ，“La transmission du mouvement nationaliste au Turkestanoriental（Xinjiang）”，Central Asian Survey ，Vol.9，No.1，1990，pp.29-48；Justin Rudelson，Oasis Identities ：Uyghur Nationalism Along China ‘s SilkRoad，New York ，Columbia University Press，1997，pp.55-57.

[8]Andrew D.Forbes，Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia ，A PoliticalHistory of Republican Xinjiang 1911-1949，Cambridge，Cambridge University Press，1986，pp.63-121.

[9]Linda Benson，The Ili Rebellion：The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authorityin Xinjiang ，1944-1949，New York ，Armonk ，Sharpe ，1990；David Wang ，Under the Soviet Shadow ：The Yining Incident；Ethnic Conflicts and InternationalRivalry in Xinjiang ，1944-1949，Hong Kong，Chinese University Press ，1999.

[10]Barry Sautman，“Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China：the Case of Xinjiang”，Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities，Vol.4，No.1/2，spring/summer 1998，pp.86-113.

[11]This colonisation policy ，for example，has just been openly encouragedanew by the Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCP on March 19th 1996：its confidential session was devoted to maintaining stability in Xinjiang （“Guanyuweihu Xinjiang wending de huiyi jiyao ，zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuanhui”An Englishversion of this text has been published by Human Rights Watch ）。

[12]James D.Seymour ，“Xinjiang‘s Production and Construction Corps andthe Sinification of Eastern Turkestan ”，Inner Asia ，Vol.2，No.2，2000，pp.171-94；Nicolas Becquelin，“Chinese hold on Xinjiang：Strengths and Limits”，in Fran ？ois Godement ed.，La Chine et son Occident.China and its WesternFrontier，Les Cahiers de l ’Asie，IFRI ，Paris，2002，pp.62-66；Xinjiangshengchan jianshe bingtuan tongji nianjian，（Statistical Yearbook of the Productionand Construction Corps in Xinjiang），Peking ，Zhongguo tongji chubanshe，1999.

[13]It is hard to calculate the real number of Han living in Xinjiang becausethe Chinese authorities ，in their statistics，only declare communities underthe jurisdiction of regional authorities and not those under the jurisdiction ofthe central authorities.

[14]By Islamism，we shall understand any movement led by intellectuals benefitingfrom a modern education whose aim is“to build，starting with the power of thestate ，a global political system which would manage all aspects of the societyand the economy ，founding its authority only on Islam and rejecting any politicalpluralism ”，（Olivier Roy ，Gén éalogie de l ‘islamisme ，Hachette ，Paris，2002，p.10）。

[15]Bearing in mind the structural deficit of the autonomous region‘s finances（about 50%of the regional budget at the end of the 1990s），Xinjiang is mainlydependant on funding from central government（see Nicolas Becquelin ，“Xinjiangin the nineties ”，China Journal，No.44，July 2000，pp.71-74）。

[16]In January 2000，Peking launched the campaign it called “Opening up theGreat West”（Xibu dakaifa）in order to reduce the development gap between theEast and the West of China.It aims in particular to encourage investment in thewhole area made up of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ，the Autonomous Regionsof Tibet，of Ningxia ，of Guangxi ，of Inner Mongolia，the provinces of Qinghai，Gansu ，Shaanxi，Sichuan，Yunnan ，Guizhou and the municipality of Chongqing.Although the effectiveness of the proposed measures is doubtful ，the Xinjiangauthorities refer frequently to them to assure the autochthonous populations thatthey have not been abandoned and that all measures are being taken to improve theirliving conditions.On the campaign and what is at stake ，see David S.G.Goodman，“The politics of the West：equality ，nation-building and colonisation ”，inLa Chine et son Occident.China and its Western Frontier，IFRI ，Les Cahiers d‘Asie，Paris，2001，pp.23-55.

[17]2002Zhongguo tongji nianjian（Statistical Yearbook of China ），Peking，Zhongguo tongji chubanshe ，2002，p.51.

[18]The main pioneer areas were opened up along the Hami-Turfan-Urumqi-Changji-Shiheziline，and along a line pushing out westwards （Yanji-Korla-Luntai-Aksu ……）。Extending the transport infrastructures mainly favoured colonisation by making zonesthat were formerly remote more accessible to the colonists.In the 1950s，onlyKumul （Hami）was linked to the rest of the Chinese railway network.Urumqi waslinked up in 1960.The Turfan-Korla section was completed in 1984，connectingUrumqi to the Kazakh frontier was achieved in the early 1990s and the Korla-Aksu-Kashgarsection in 1999.The cross-desert road linking Khotan to Korla was finished in 1995.Thus，since the north of the Tarim Basin was given its rail link to the Chinesenetwork and since Khotan was linked by road to the north of the Tarim Basin ，thehistorical centres of Uyghur population ，once isolated，have been receiving asteady influx of colonists.

[19]The threshold set by the international organisations is about a dollarper day （that is ，about 3，000yuan per year ）。

[20]In Xinjiang，bearing in mind the omnipresence of putonghua in the administrationand the economy ，it is essential to master it in order to rise to posts of responsibility.Young Uyghur pupils have a choice between attending “Uyghur classes”where teachingis conducted mainly in Uyghur and “Chinese classes ”where teaching is conductedin Mandarin （Chinese ）。The Uyghur elite （often mastering Mandarin by themselves）frequently send their children to the Chinese classes to ensure for them betterchances of professional success.However，bearing in mind the risks of losing one‘s own culture that this choice incurs for some people ，bearing in mind the fairlystrict compartmentalisation of Han and Uyghur housing ，and also because in theremote rural Uyghur areas these Chinese classes are not available ，most Uyghurfamilies send their children to the “Uyghur classes”near where they live.Thus，many young people ，despite the existence of Chinese lessons and classes taughtin Chinese in the “Uyghur classes”，do not master Chinese by the time they leave.

[21]The continuous influx of the Han produces on the labour market significanttensions that are aggravated by the fact that the economy is dominated by the Han.Since Han people prefer to be surrounded by Han people，the jobs that they creatego to them and not to the Uyghurs.This “preferential job recruitment”is mainlyobservable in the private sector where there is no encouragement for employers torecruit from the national minorities.Many Uyghurs speak resentfully of this kindof discrimination in the labour market and complain that，with equal or superiorskills，they cannot compete with the Han or the Hui（Interviews，Xinjiang ，1999-2002）。

[22]Emily Hannum and Yu Xie，“Ethnic stratification in Northwest China：occupationaldifferences between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang ，1982-1990”，Demography，Vol.35，No.3，1998，p.328.

[23]See Michael Hechter，Internal Colonialism ：The Celtic Fringe in BritishNational Development，1536-1966，London ，Routledge and Kegan Paul ，1975.WhetherXinjiang fulfils the half-dozen criteria that qualify a territory as an interiorcolony is the subject of much debate.However ，in our opinion ，whether the peripheralcommunity considers itself to be colonised is more important than validating thesecriteria，when it comes to understanding how these situations of stratification（perceived or real ）can lead to ethnic nationalism.

[24]Interviews ，1999-2002.See for example ，East Turkistan InformationCenter（ETIC），“Sherqiy Turkistanda Bashbalasi Hitay Ko ？menliri ”（The ChineseMigrants in East Turkistan），www.uygur.org.

[25]Interviews ，Xinjiang ，1999-2002.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Cf note 22.

[28]Colin Mackerras，“Xinjiang and the causes of separatism ”，Central AsianSurvey，Vol.20，No.3，2001，p.290.

[29]See Elizabeth Allès ，Le ？la Ch érif-Chebbi &Constance-Hél ène Halfon，“L ‘islam chinois ，unit éet fragmentation”，Archives de sciences socialesdes religions ，n°115，2001，pp.15-47.

[30]On religious education in China，see Elisabeth Allès ，“Muslim ReligiousEducation in China”，China Perspectives ，No.45，January-February 2003，pp.21-29.

[31]As Pierre Bourdieu has underlined in his analysis of the relationship betweenthe habitus and class conflicts ，the habitus is governed by relational influences.Above all ，it is public ，in that it is meant to carry meaning in other people‘s eyes.In this regard，the study of the evolution of the Uyghur habitus givesus extensive information on the nature of the relations between the Uyghurs andthe Chinese centre.

[32]Artoush Kumul，“Le séparatisme ou？ghour au XXe si ècle ”，CEMOTI ，n °25，January-June 1998，p.88.

[33]Zhang Yumo ，“The Anti-Separatism Struggle and its Historical Lessonssince the Liberation of Xinjiang”in Yang Faren et al.，Fanyisilanzhuyi，fantujuezhuyiyanjiu（Study on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism ），1994，a document translatedand published in English on the web site of the Uyghur American Association ，www.uyghuramerican.org/researchanalysis/trans.html.

[34]The meshrep are gatherings at the local level，favouring the communicationof traditional Uyghur culture.This movement for revitalising traditional culturewas intended also to stem the loss of “moral values”among young Uyghurs （theweakening of intergenerational solidarity ，criminal behaviour ，consumption ofdrugs and alcohol …）。

[35]Amnesty International，“People‘s Republic of China ：Gross Violationsof Human Rights in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region ”，April 1st 1999，pp.18-19.

[36]On the rise of militant nationalism among young Uyghurs，see also thestudy by Joanne Smith ，“Four Generations of Uyghurs ：the Shift towards Ethno-politicalIdeologies among Xinjiang ‘s Youth ”，Inner Asia ，Vol.2，No.2，2000，pp.195-224.

[37]Although this study sets out in particular to look at the political manifestationsof the“Uyghur malaise”it is important to note that this malaise also feeds a“sub-political resistance”anchored mainly in the daily life of the Uyghurs.Onthis question ，see Gardner Bovington，“The Not-So-Silent Majority：Uyghur Resistanceto Han Rule in Xinjiang ”，Modern China ，Vol.28，No.1，January 2002，pp.39-78.

[38]This study is limited to active movements in Xinjiang.On political groupingsin the Diaspora ，see Fr éd érique-Jeanne Besson ，“Les Ou？ghours de la diaspora”，Cahiers d ‘études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien（CEMOTI），n°25，July-December 1998，pp.161-192.

[39]Cf note 6.On this point ，over and above the debate about emancipationand the means to achieve it ，the accent is placed either on the struggle for therecognition of the sovereign rights of the Uyghur nation，or else on the need todefend the interests of the various Turkic-speaking populations within the contextof a Pan-Turkic project on the scale of Xinjiang：both views are aired in the debateamong the different nationalist movements over how the region should be named ：Uyghuristan in the former view，East Turkistan for the latter.See ，on the question，ETIC，“Sherqiy Turkistanmu ？Uyghuristanmu？”（East Turkistan？Uyghuristan？）。

[40]Interviews ，Uyghur Diaspora 2002.According to Artoush Kumul ，it wasalready active in the late 1950s（see Artoush Kumul ，op.cit.，p.85）。

[41]Taipei Times ，October 11th 1999.

[42]Zhang Yumo ，op.cit.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Cf note 8.

[45]Ibid.

[46]The main part of the Uyghur Diaspora has sought refuge in Central Asiawhere it numbers according to the 1989census in Kazakhstan 180，000people（500，000according to Uyghur associations ），40，000people in Kirghizstan （250，000according to the associations），5，000in Turkmenistan （20，000for theassociations）and a total that is hard to calculate in Uzbekistan（many Uyghurshaving registered themselves as Uzbeks）。The rest of the Diaspora is settled inTurkey（about 10，000people）and，in smaller numbers ，in Germany ，Australia，Saudi Arabia，Sweden ，Canada ，the US ，India and Pakistan.

[47]The new name for the former Shanghai Group created in 1996，the SCO includesRussia，China，Kazakhstan ，Kirghizstan，Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan.

[48]Thus ，for example，the government of Kazakhstan ，which had officiallyrecognised organisations seeking independence that were operating within its territory（The United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan ，the Organisationfor the Liberation of Uyghuristan and the Union of Uyghur Peoples ）ended up bybanning them in 1995under pressure from the Chinese government.On the repressionof the Uyghur militants in Central Asia ，see ETIC ，“Sherqiy Turkistanning 2002-yiliYanwardin –Mayghi？e Bolghan Arliqtiki Insan Heqliri Weziyiti Heqqide TeyarlanghanMehsus Dokilat”（Special report on the state of human rights in East Turkistanover the period January-May 2002），May 1st 2002，pp.7-8.

[49]Control over illegal religious activities was tightened by means of regulationssuch as Temporary Regulations on Controlling Religious Meetings in the XinjiangUyghur Autonomous Region in 1988and Regulations on Religious Activities in theXinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1995.

[50]This list，commonly called Secret Document No.7，stresses ，for example，the need to purge the Communist Party and the local administration of their leastreliable elements ，to strengthen propaganda against separatism，to tighten controlover the people of Xinjiang ，to encourage the influx of officials and Han colonistswithin the Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps in order to control the region，to control strictly the building of new mosques ，to give leading positions inthe mosques and religious organisations to people who love their“mother country”，to register all people who have been trained in religious schools without permissionand to keep them under surveillance ，to take“strong measures to prevent religionfrom interfering in social and political affairs…”See “Guanyu weihu Xinjiangwending de huiyi jiyao，zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuanhui”，op.cit.

[51]In Xinjiang，the everyday use of torture，ill-treatment and executionsfollowing summary trials contrast with the relative mildness of the repressive apparatusin the interior of China itself.According to a report by Amnesty International ，between April 1997and 1999，a minimum of 190executions were recorded（AmnestyInternational ，“People‘s Republic of China ”：Gross Violations of Human Rightsin the Xinjiang Autonomous Region “，op.cit.）。For Marie Holzman，the proportionof Uyghurs among Chinese citizens condemned to death is ten times higher than theirshare of the Chinese population （a personal communication）。This repressive downturnwas itself exacerbated by the serious events that took place in February 1997.OnFebruary 5th and 6th that year，violent rioting broke out in Ghulja（Yining）。It was brutally put down.The police crackdown and the widespread arrests that followedinstilled a climate of terror that left its mark on people’s minds.Despite anofficial figure of nine killed and a hundred wounded，the probable death toll amongthe rioters reached several dozen.

[52]Many books suspected of spreading“unhealthy ”ideas are thus removed fromthe shelves and even publicly burned on occasion（the best-known case is that ofTurghun Almas ‘s books on the history of the Uyghurs ）。Uyghurs working in theadministration as well as those who are students are strongly advised not to practiseIslam on pain of disciplinary measures against them or even being thrown out oftheir universities or losing their jobs.The closure of mosques or illegal religiousschools are routinely mentioned in the press，and the imams and preachers involvedsuffer heavy penalties.In March 2001，the Chinese regime launched a much dislikedcampaign called “the patriotic re-education of imams ”。The imams are thus obligedto attend patriotic education classes （at the risk of losing their authorizationto practise ）while numerous restrictions have been imposed on religious educationin the region （for example ，in the rest of China ，the imams are fairly freeto give religious instruction to an indefinite number of students in schools attachedto the mosques；but in Xinjiang，they may not give instruction to more than oneor two pupils each）。

[53]See，for example，ETIC ，“Hitay Hokumiti Sherqiy Turkistanda YurguziwatqanBir –Birige Zir Diniy Siyasetliri Arqiliq Ozining Asasi Qanunini Ayaq –AstiQilmaqta”（The Chinese government violates its own constitution in the contradictoryreligious campaigns that it wages in East Turkistan ）。

[54]For example，the events at Khotan in July 1995are connected to the successivearrests of several charismatic imams.The uprising in Ghulja in February 1997seemsto have followed several unpopular measures among which was the banning of the meshrepand the arrest of a prayer group during Ramadan.

[55]On the disturbances that have rocked Xinjiang over the last two years，Michael Dillon，“Xinjiang：Ethnicity，Separatism ，and Control in Chinese CentralAsia”，Durham East Asian Papers ，No.1，1995，pp.17-31.

[56]A score of Uyghur organisations have taken a step towards coordinatingtheir activities by creating the East Turkistan National Congress （ETNC）and itspermanent office in Munich in October 1999.The statutes and aims of the ETNC maybe consulted on the web site：www.eastturkistan.com

[57]Chinese military infrastructure，the railway lines that bring the Hancolonists into Xinjiang and the pipelines that export local hydrocarbons to therest of China are favoured targets for these acts of sabotage.

[58]For an exhaustive list of the violent acts attributed by the Chinese regimeto the separatists in Xinjiang，see“True nature of‘East Turkestan’forces”，China Daily ，January 22nd 2002.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]For many Uyghur militants，the absence of support from the West and particularlyfrom the United States tends to drive some of them into the arms of the Islamists（Interviews，1999-2002）。

[62]Coming mainly from Pakistan.

[63]Bearing in mind the friendly relations that China and Pakistan strive tomaintain，the subject is still taboo ；but the comings and goings of Pakistanipreachers following the opening of the Karakorum road to cross-border trade haveseriously irritated the Chinese authorities.As a sign of protest ，China closedits frontier with Pakistan between 1992and 1994.A few months after it was reopened，China arrested nearly 450Pakistanis who had committed“illegal actions ”in Xinjiang.The Chinese diplomats refused to confirm that some of them had been arrested forreligious or political proselytising but this silence seems to suggest this wasthe case（Nawai Waqt，June 4th 1996）。Several Pakistani traders who regularlypass through Kashgar have indicated to me that they have stopped attending the mosqueto“keep out of trouble with the Chinese authorities”。

[64]St éphane Dudoignon ，“Islam d ‘Europe？Islam d’Asie？En Eurasiecentrale（Russie，Caucase，Asie centrale”in L‘Islam en Asie ，du Caucase àla Chine，edited by Andr ée Feillard，Paris，La Documentation fran？aise，p.67.

[65]The HT is a neo-fundamentalist organization.Unlike the Jihadist partieswhose primary aim is to seize political power by force，this organization focusesits action on the re-Islamization of Muslim people before concentrating on takingpower by force.Originating in Jordan ，it has spread across the Muslim world andparticularly in Uzbekistan where it has become，together with the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan ，the bête noire of President Karimov.See Ahmed Rashid ，Asiecentrale，champ de guerres.Cinq R épubliques faceàl ‘islam radical ，AutrementFrontières ，Paris，2002，pp.106-123.This organisation has been operatingfor a while in Xinjiang.A few Uyghurs recruited in Uzbekistan and in Kirghizstanwent back to Xinjiang to form cells that have spread in the late 1990s（Interviews，2002）。

[66]International Herald Tribune ，October 15th 2001.

[67]In December 1995，about a hundred Uyghurs，mostly financed by the Jamaat-eIslami，took a course at the Sayed Mawdudi Institute at Lahore or in other Koranicschools in Pakistan （The Herald，December 1995）。

[68]In 1997，this neo-fundamendalist organisation declared that it was carryingout “missionary activities ”on the other side of the Chinese frontier （Asia Times，February 12th 1997）。

[69]This guerrilla movement active in Kashmir is linked to the Jamaat-e Islamiand to the Afghan Hizb-e Islami.

[70]Influenced by Salafism ，these movements“demand a return to strict Islam，free of any local customs or cultures ”and “call for Jihad to recover ‘occupied’Muslim lands，and even to fight against Muslim regimes that they consider astraitors”（Mariam Abou Zahab &Olivier Roy ，Réseaux islamiques.La connexionafghano-pakistanaise，collection CERI/Autrement，Paris，2002，p.5）。

[71]On these organisations ，see Mariam Abou Zahab &Olivier Roy，op.cit.

[72]According to Indian officials，three Uyghurs were captured during battlesin Kashmir two years ago.

[73]“Jiangdu yu qian ren ladan ying shouxun”（More than a thousand independencecampaigners from Xinjiang were given training in bin Laden‘s camps ），Mingbao，November 3rd 2001.

[74]Interviews ，2002.

[75]The Uyghurs continue to practice a form of Islam that is still stronglyinfluenced by Sufism and the cult of saints.Apart from those who have gone abroador from some young urbans （who are often disconnected from Sufi networks ），thepeople of Xinjiang are still generally resistant to the radical versions of Islamand often show themselves to be very critical of such practices.

[76]The present rise to power of the HT in Xinjiang probably arises from itspolitical methods ，which are peaceful （which gives it a more “respectable ”image ）and ultra-secret （its militants are less exposed to Chinese repressionthan they would be by the violent acts of Jihadist groups.）。It also accepts puttingstress on the improvement of the individual and achieving well-being in the lightof a purified form of Islam.Indeed ，in addition to its political project of joininga great caliphate （and thus its aim of winning freedom from the Chinese“yoke”），the accent it puts on the individual religious dimension is considered by its adherents（often young urban dropouts）as the means of ending the social problems whichaffect Uyghur society （the collapse of social solidarity ，criminality，drug-taking…）

[77]Zhongguo xinwenshe ，July 7th 2000；South China Morning Post ，“Victoryclaimed against Muslims Rebels”，January 13th 2001.

[78]See“Uygurs‘part of world problem ’”，South China Morning Post ，November16th 2001，“Bin Laden ‘s Network ：A Chinese View ”，People ’s Daily ，November16th 2001：“Guowuyuan ：Ladan chuci peixun xindu ）”（State Council ：bin Ladenfinances the training of Xinjiang ‘s independence activists）“，Mingpao，January22nd 2002，China Daily，January 22nd 2002（op.cit.）

[79]Dongtu corresponds to the abbreviated form in Chinese of East Turkistan.

[80]See China Daily，op.cit.The report published by the State Council accusesthe ETIM of having set up cells in Xinjiang for training people how to handle explosivesand for having created significant caches of arms and bomb-making products.

[81]The fact that these organisations have very similar names，added to thepresence of Uyghurs among the IMU fighters taken prisoner in northern Afghanistan，support this idea.

[82]In fact，the American decision probably had less to do with the struggleagainst international terrorism than with American anxieties about China‘s exportsof technologies considered to be“sensitive ”。For many analysts，adding theETIM to this notorious black list had the principal aim of satisfying China so asto induce Peking to stop its missile sales to potentially aggressive countries（at the same time，China has indeed drawn up new regulations governing its missileexports ）（Xinhua，August 26th 2002）。

Source:

香港中文大学

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=3033